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Abstract
Basic problems of complex systems are outlined with an emphasis on irreducibil-
ity and dynamic many-to-many correspondences. We discuss the importance of a
constructive approach to artificial reality and the significance of an internal observer.
1 Introduction
For over hundred years, scientists, above all, physicists have tried to understand the
complexity of nature, by decomposing it into simple processes that can be dealt with by
simple theories. This strategy is often referred to as “Ockham’s razor”. It was regarded as
ideal, in modern science, to describe a system in terms of a small number of parameters,
variables, equations, etc. In a strict sense, however, the reduction to a system with a
small number of degrees of freedom is not always possible. Then, one may introduce a
“noise” term instead, in order to take residual degrees of freedom into account.
In statistical physics, this reduction was successful because of the introduction of
appropriate order parameters. Even when a system has many degrees of freedom, it can
often well be described by a macroscopic order parameter with a corresponding noise
term, as can, for example be seen in equilibrium statistical mechanics, linear-response
theory, system-size (omega) expansion [2, 3], and slaving principle [4].
A related paradigm is the use of a “mode”. Here a system is assumed to be represented
by the superposition of some modes, like the Fouirer modes. In solid-state physics these
are attributed to some excitation, termed as “—on’s”. The use of modes is powerful as
long as the system can be approximated by a linear one. In dynamical systems, it is also
successful, even if the system is nonlinear, as long as it is not chaotic. It can be employed,
for example, in quasiperiodic motion on a torus and in the representation by solitons.
The reductionists’ pictures have been challenged by the discovery of chaos. First, the
amplification of a tiny perturbation in chaos implies that the separation between micro-
scopic and macroscopic levels is no longer possible. Second, the picture of “modes” is
not straightforwardly applicable to chaos: Even if a system has just three degrees of free-
dom, it can implicitly include continuously many modes. For example, a chaotic system
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cannot be represented by a finite number of Fourier modes. A one-to-one correspondence
of simply chosen coordinates (such as Fourier modes) to original variables is no longer
valid here. Complexity in grammatical rules to characterize chaos is discussed in detail
by Crutchfield in the present volume.
Another challenge to the traditional picture can be found in a system called spin
glass, which originated in the statistical mechanics of spin system with random inter-
action [6]. In relation with the phase transition problem, physicists searched for order
parameter(s). However, a detailed theoretical analysis shows that the order in the low-
temperature phase is represented only by a functional of order parameters, rather than
a finite number of them. Indeed, in the neural network model based on the statistical
mechanics of nonhomogeneous spin systems ( often called as Hopfield model), a one-to-
one correspondence between an interaction code and an attractor is no longer valid, when
the number of stored input patterns is larger than a certain threshold. In spin glasses,
the correspondence between an interaction and an attractor ( or a thermodynamically
metastable state) is highly complex, while, the sample dependence (i.e., dependence on
the choice of couplings) remains finite even in the thermodynamic limit.
Thus the one-to-one correspondence between states and representations is challenged
statically by spin glasses and dynamically by chaos. We need some framework to deal
with the dynamical change of relationships among elements.
2 Logic for dynamic many-to-many correspondences
Let a system be composed of many dynamic elements, and chaotic motion be assumed
in the system. Then any perturbation put in one element can be transmitted to other
elements with amplification. In this situation, a chain of causal relationships can bring
about unexpected results [12, 9]. (A Japanese proverb for such a ‘strong’ causal connection
is “If the wind blows strongly then (finally) bath tubs sell well” [12, 9].) The reasoning is
the following: 1. If the wind blows strongly, the number of blind people increases due to
the dust entering in their eyes. 2. If so, they try to earn money by playing a ‘shamisen’
( a traditional Japanese musical instrument made of cat’s skin). 3. If so, the demand for
‘shamisen’ increases. 4. If so, cats are hunted recklessly. 5. If so, cats extremely decrease
in population. 6. If so, mice increase in population. 7. If so, (wooden) tubs are gnawed
by mice. 8. If so, tubs are sold well.
One of the authors(KK) encountered such situations when working with coupled map
lattices [16] or networks of chaotic elements [17]. In a coupled map lattice with chaotic
dynamics, a tiny perturbation at a lattice point is amplified to nearby elements. A
macroscopic order corresponding to the dissipative structure[5] can appear, but again be
destroyed by the chaotic dynamics until a next ordered structure appears. In a network of
chaotic elements, clusters of synchronized oscillations may appear. Identical elements can
differentiate due to the orbital instability in chaotic dynamics. This mechanism, called
(dynamical) clustering, is commonly seen in globally coupled dynamical systems. Futher-
more, the members of a strongly correlated group change in time, leading to a ceaseless
change of relationships (see Kaneko in the present volume). Clustering and collective
behaviors can also be seen in globally coupled oscillators as studied by Nakagawa. The
synchronization between external (limb’s) and internal (neural) oscillations is essential to
the model of bipedal locomotion by Taga in this volume.
Besides in chaos research [7], the use of one-to-one correspondence has been challenged
in many branches of science. In brain science, the hypothesis of a grandmother cell
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has been doubted. Such doubts have led to the notion of a distributed representation
of information, and the research of neural networks related with the spin glass theory.
However, such challenges remain at a static level. In contrast with the static logic, the
necessity of a dynamic logic has been postulated by Malsburg, Vaadia, Aertsen, Dinse,
Freeman, one of the authors (IT), and so on ( see the papers by Tsuda, Aertsen, Dinse,
and Freeman in the present volume).
In an ecological system the necessity of a logic that grasps a complex system without
reduction to an ensemble of simple elements has been stressed by Elton [8]. Kawanabe
has pointed out the necessity of a logic to represent the above Japanese proverb. Indeed
it is known that in some ecological systems there are keystone species, a removal of which
strongly damages the whole ecosystem 1.
Ikegami and one of the authors(KK) have studied a population dynamics model with
many types of hosts and parasites, which are subjected to mutations. In a weak coupling
regime, a one-to-one relationship between a host and a parasite holds, while dynamic
many-to-many relationships between pairs of hosts and parasites emerge in a strong cou-
pling regime, together with the maintenance of a high mutation rate. We note that the
resulting ecology is dynamically stable, sustained by a high-dimensional chaotic state,
in contrast with the strong instability in a low-dimensional chaotic population dynam-
ics. Some theory for dynamic many-to-many correspondences is required to allow for the
diversity in an ecosystem.
In the present proceedings, Yomo presents the dynamic clustering of E-coli, bacteria.
Even if these bacteria have identical DNA, they dynamically differentiate. The one-to-one
correspondence between a genotype and a phenotype is invalid here. A novel mechanism
for the differentiation of cells is proposed, based on the idea of dynamical clustering (see
Kaneko and Yomo).
Let us recall the history of Japanese literature. About three hundred years ago, it
was popular to have ceremonies during which Haiku’s (short poems) were recited. The
ceremony staged poets who made poems in succession, following the previous poem by
somebody else. A poet “interprets” the previous poem by him(her)self. This interpre-
tation, of course, may be different from the original poet’s. Thus mis-interpretation is
enhanced successively, but as a whole the sequence of poems forms some art more aesthetic
than that created by a single poet. This process consists of the dynamic amplification
of small deviations. “Collective” art at a higher level emerges as an ensemble of poems.
One might think that this process is just a kind of bottom-up approach to collective art.
This is not necessarily true. To address this problem, let us re-examine the top-down and
bottom-up approaches.
3 Top-down, bottom-up, and emergence
There have been long debates between the top-down and bottom-up proponents in arti-
ficial intelligence and neural networks. In both approaches, it is assumed implicitly that
the top level is represented by a few degrees of freedom, while the bottom level may
involve a huge number of degrees of freedom. In the bottom-up approach some kind of
“order parameter” constructed from the lower level is viewed as a representation at a
higher level, related with some macroscopic behavior. In the top-down approach only a
1This does not mean that such ecosystems are dominated by (few) keystone species. A role of a
keystone species implicitly emerges within an ecological network, through the amplification of tiny causes
as illustrated in the Japanese proverb.
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few instructions are sent as messages to lower-level elements.
As a natural compromise between these approaches, the inclusion of a weak feedback
between the top/bottom levels has been proposed. An example is given by a simulation
of ants with pheromone [15]. In the simulation, an ant emits pheromone when it has food,
while other ants are attracted by pheromone through their motion. A collective field of
pheromone is formed by the ants’ motion. Since the dynamics of a lower-level unit (an
ant’s motion) is governed by the higher-level dynamics ( collective field of pheromone),
this scheme is analogous with the Prigogine’s dissipative structure [5] or Haken’s slaving
principle [4].
In these approaches the relationships between elements are fixed. Although it may
be possible to introduce nontrivial dynamics (e.g., in the ants’ motion or in the field
of pheromone), the behaviors of each element are passive and totally susceptible to a
higher-level.
Most papers in the present proceedings adopt a different approach in the following
senses. First, the top level is not necessarily represented by a few degrees of freedom;
second, the relationships between elements at a lower level can often change dynamically.
At first glance, the first point may just look like a complication. This is not necessarily so.
Even in the midst of highly disorganized states, ordered motion governed by a few degrees
of freedom often emerges, which, however, does not last for ever due to the second point
(the dynamic change of relationships). Again, high-dimensional motion comes back, until
another structure emerges. This mechanism, called chaotic itinerancy [17, 23, 13, 24], can
replace the views of the top-down and the bottom-up approaches. In a network of chaotic
elements, for example, the order at the top level is destroyed by a chaotic revolt against
the slaving principle [17], in contrast with passive elements in traditional approaches. In
the dynamic neural network model by one of the authors (IT), the chaotic itinerancy leads
to a spontaneous recall of memories [13]. A similar dynamical behavior is also observed
in real brain activities. In the present proceedings, this topic is studied in the papers by
Tsuda, Aertsen, Dinse, Freeman, and Nozawa.
In the population dynamics model mentioned in §2 [18], the higher-level corresponds
to the collective dynamics for survival as an ensemble of many types. This higher level
emerges from the bottom level, but it is not necessarily represented by a few degrees of
freedom. An ecosystem like Ray’s TIERRA, with species of programs, is not necessarily
represented by a few sets of features. Species with different properties appear successively
in a specific condition. In the paper by Palmer, a stock market is formed as a higher
level.
The term “emergence” is often used as spontaneous appearance of an upper level
description without explicit instruction for it [19]. If the upper level is represented by a
few order parameters, the term “emergence”, in this case, is just a rephrase of a dissipative
structure in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics, or a collective behavior in equilibrium
phase transitions. When the upper level is not represented by a few degrees of freedom,
however, the emergence is no longer trivial.
The term emergence is often used when the behavior found in a computer experiment
is not written in a model explicitly as an algorithm. In order to be an “emergent” be-
havior, an explanation of it from the implemented program should require at least as
much as the information as the direct computation. Such “wishes” for the construction of
emergence may not be rigorously accomplished as long as one uses a finite-state machine
(e.g., digital computer) for a finite time interval, since the simulated behavior is obtained
by a completely controlled program, with a finite amount of information. As long as all
the information is finite, it is difficult to define a behavior “unexpected” from the imple-
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mentation. Thus many people have tried to avoid this term in the workshop, although we
tacitly feel that “emergence” is necessary for the understanding of the dynamics in brains
and in biological evolution.
There can be two possibilities to remedy the above impossibility of emergence. One is
the assumption of the use of infinite cells or tapes and/or a possible use of infinite time
step computations. In connection with the undecidability of the halting problem, it may
be possible to have emergence by taking an infinite-step limit.
The other is the introduction of uncontrollability up to an infinite precision. Let us
recall the Japanese proverb; given the strong wind, the outcome that the tub is sold
well is rather unexpected. To explain this process, we have to follow each step of the
reasoning, which itself is easily affected by a small error. The outcome, in this case, can
be emergent behavior. By the introduction of an analog computer with chaotic dynamics
and/or error in it, one may thus expect the occurrence of emergence. We note that notions
of computability in a real-number machine, discussed by [25, 26] in connection with chaos,
may be essential to explore this possibility.
Another way for the introduction of uncontrollability may be the introduction of a
quantum mechanical computer, as is discussed by Conrad.
Even in our digital computer of finite resources, there can be some hope. Chaos, for
example, cannot be simulated rigorously by any digital machine: As long as a state in the
machine is finite, the dynamics becomes periodic (Poincare recurrence), finally. Still, we
can grasp the features of chaos (by taking the limit of infinitely many states) in a digital
computer. In a similar manner, emergence may be defined by taking the limit of infinitely
many states from our digital machine. To understand the nature of this limit, we need
to make more efforts to construct a model with some kind of emergence, and also some
mathematical studies on the relationships between digital and other computers.
4 From a Descriptive to Constructive approach of
Nature
Structural stability [27] had been presented and recognized as a necessary condition of
a real model, before the significance of chaos was appreciated. On the other hand, for
a system with structural instability, a slight change of the model may lead to behaviors
with different characteristics from real solution’s. This is why such a system is believed
not to be a good model for nature. However, structural instability can widely be seen in
a nonlinear system including chaos. For example, chaos in the logistic map x′ = ax(1−x)
cannot exist in an open interval in the parameter space a. This means that a map with
some fixed parameter has no topological equivalence in any neighborhood of that map,
thus implying structural instability.
Chaos may have another transcendental nature. In some cases with non-uniform hy-
perbolicity, chaos may lack the pseudo-orbit-tracing property[28, 29]. If so, this means
that individual orbits in chaos cannot be traced by experiments or by numerical simu-
lations. It is still questionable if a whole attractor, i.e., a strange attractor itself can
be traced in experiments. At least one counter-example exists against the assertion
that a strange attractor itself is traced. In some chaotic systems such as the Belousov-
Zhabotinsky reaction map, chaos looses characteristics such as topological and measure-
theoretic quantities, affected by noise, and consequently order that does not exist in any
neighborhood of the original system appears [30]. A drastic change appears in the case
of somewhat large noise, but the calculation of the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy implies the
creation of different chaotic systems even in case of infinitely small perturbations. This
so called noise-induced order [30] has been interpreted in terms of an observational mis-
match between the system’s inherent observation window, i.e. Markov partition, and the
external observation window forced by noise.
A complete description of chaos needs an infinite amount of information. By a slight
change of coding, in the case of a chaotic system, the description of the system as, for
instance, a finite automaton can change drastically.
Crutchfield has dealt with chaos as a class of various levels of finite automata. The
input information is hierarchically classified as a language accepted by a machine that
is constituted of chaos with a finite observation window and observed symbol sequences.
Then, chaos appears as a kind of a finite automaton according to the respective observation
window. One of the authors(KK) also discussed the dynamics of a coding scheme in a
network of chaotic elements, where the coding tree of observed symbol sequence changes
forever [17]. Any difference in the observation precision leads to a crucial change of the
dynamics [20].
Thus chaos manifests itself in various forms, depending sensitively on its description.
By these observations, one of the authors (IT) has introduced the term “descriptive in-
stability”, although further studies are necessary for its mathematical definition.
Noise-induced order, a coding tree in the network of chaotic elements, and Crutch-
field’s ǫ -machine have introduced novel viewpoints with regard to the ‘observation’ or
‘description’ in complex systems. Thereby, one may notice the need of a more extended
concept than structural (in)stability in order to capture legitimately all the features of
complex systems. Here, what we need is not a concept representing the system, but a con-
cept about an ‘observer’ describing the system. Noise-induced order means that a change
of the description of chaos brings about a distinct phase of chaos due to the “descriptive
instability” of chaos.
The notion of “descriptive instability” raises a question about the validity of a de-
scriptive way of modeling. Since a one-to-one correspondence is not possible for each
elementary process, a descriptive approach that always accompanies analysis is not al-
ways relevant for the understanding of a complex system.
In physics, we are used to adopt a descriptive approach; for example, an equation at
a macroscopic level ( like the Navier-Stokes equation) is approximately derived from a
microscopic level (like the Newtonian equation of many particles), and then numerically
simulated. Conventionally, a model equation in physics is believed to have a one-to-one
correspondence with the phenomenon concerned.
Studies on chaos, however, may lead one to question this traditional picture of na-
ture. Let us take the example of chaos in fluid dynamics. If one carries out a splendid
numerical simulation on sets of equations with the velocity and temperature fields ( e.g.,
Navier-Stokes equation with buoyancy and heat), one possibly can get the same oscilla-
tory behavior of rolls as in experiments. Does this success give any better intuition on
the origin of this strange oscillation than that provided by a simple chaotic system? The
authors think that the answer is “No” for most scientists who know about chaos. One
of the most important lessons from chaos lies in that it has opened the road to a quali-
tative dynamical viewpoint. Low-dimensional chaos can provide a universal mechanism
underlying the onset of turbulence.
By developing further the viewpoint of chaos, the importance of a constructive, rather
than a descriptive, approach has been pointed out. An example of such a constructive
approach is the coupled map lattice [16], proposed by one of the authors (KK) for the
studies of spatiotemporal chaos, pattern dynamics, and so on. The model, constructed
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by combining some basic procedures ( such as local chaos, diffusion, flow, · · ·), cannot
be derived from a first-principle equation like in conventional physics, but it still has a
strong predictive power for novel phenomenology classes in complex dynamical systems.
A model cannot be exactly the same as nature herself anyway. By “descriptive instabil-
ity” there may not be a well-defined quantitative “distance” between a model and nature.
Thus a descriptive model based on microscopic knowledge is not necessarily quantitatively
very close to the phenomena under consideration. Even if a descriptive model happens
to be quantitatively close to nature, in a complex system, it is in principle intractable
to check detailed correspondence between the model and nature, numerically or experi-
mentally. Furthemore we often do not need the detailed information of nature which is
sensitive to the details of the models. Rather, we are more interested in universal aspects
robust against changes of the model. In other words, we go up to a higher-level description
which focuses on structurally stable aspects. Thus a qualitatively correct model which
forms some universality class2is strongly required, for which the constructive approach is
often more powerful.
Through the constructive approach, one tries to understand how such phenomenology
is legitimated, how large the universality class to be described by phenomenology is, and
what the essence of the phenomena is. Only through this approach we can see why some
type of complex behavior is common in nature, irrespective of the details, and then we
can predict what class of systems leads to such behavior.
5 Why Artificial Reality
The constructive approach in the last section implies the necessity of the construction of
a model with artificial reality. The behavior of a model is not easily derived analytically
in complex systems. One needs computers as a heuristic tool, as a hypothesis generator,
rather than as a descriptor. The activities often called “artificial life” belong to this class
of modeling.
Such modeling is especially necessary when one deals with historical phenomena, like
evolution, since it is rather difficult to understand one historical path, without knowing
other could-be paths. Construction of a model with artificial reality provides an alter-
native approach when the traditional one faces difficulties. In the present proceedings,
papers by Ray, Hogeweg, Lindgren, Suzuki, Ikegami, and Hu¨bler present successful
examples, as well as the report by Fontana in the workshop [21]. Palmer, and Yasutomi
[22] have shown the power of the artificial reality approach in economics.
Frequent criticism raised to the artificial modeling is the lack of quantitative predic-
tions. In natural science, it is often presumed to be ideal to predict quantitative results
obtained in quantitatively specified experimental conditions. Such a precise quantitative
prediction is not available in artificial modeling. Still, the phenomena observed in the
artificial reality can provide a metaphor for what occurs (has occurred) in nature and in
human society. Furthermore we can understand the essence of “real” phenomena through
the artificial world, which makes qualitative prediction possible in a much broader sense.
In the present volume Li discusses an expansion-modification system, a kind of cel-
lular automata with a growing number of cells. The long-range correlation found in this
“artificial model” made him and one of the authors (KK) to expect the existence of long-
range correlations in real DNA sequences, which was later confirmed. Another example
2Here we use the term “universality class” as a qualitative class, thus, in a broader sense than adopted
in statsitical mechanics.
7
demonstrating a possible connection between artificial and “real” biology can be found in
the paper by Kaneko and Yomo in this volume.
The significance of such “artificial science” was first pointed out by Simon, in the
context of engineering science [31]. The present constructive approach to complex systems
also has some applications to engineering problems, mainly in the area of information
processing. In such a case, one constructs a system by combining procedures. Here
we should note that the combination often leads to some (emergent) performance un-
expected from the sum of procedures. We have some examples in these proceedings:
Nozawa has shown that a combination of a network of chaotic elements and a neural
network of Hopfield’s type brings about remarkable efficiency in optimization problems.
Kitano has demonstrated that the combination of a genetic algorithm and an L-system
for developmental processes provides high efficiency in learning. Taga gives a beautiful
application of the synchronization to bipedal motion, whileKopecz shows some emergent
performance in robots whose motion is controlled by artificial neural nets, so that they
successfully avoid obstacles.
6 Methodological problems in complex systems
As we have discussed so far, the behavior in an artificial world cannot be represented
by reduced sets of degrees of freedom while exactly corresponding to the complex world.
We need novel methodologies to understand the complex behaviors emerging in artifi-
cial models. So far we do not have established methods such as those in (equilibrium)
statistical mechanics. We discuss briefly some possibilities.
a) Multiple viewpoints:
It is often required to describe the observation from many points of view. For example,
the understanding of pattern dynamics in spatiotemporal chaos requires both the views
from real space and phase space. Integration of dynamical systems theory and computa-
tion theory is relevant to the understanding of complexity in chaos or cellular automata,
as shown by Crutchfield and Mitchell. For game dynamics, we need viewpoints both
from an algorithmic level of strategy, and dynamical systems theory, as is seen in the
studies of Lindgren, Ikegami, Hu¨bler, and Suzuki.
b) Mathematical anatomy in a high-dimensional phase space:
In low-dimensional dynamical systems, “anatomical” methods of geometric structures
in phase space have been developed. In complex systems, it is required to extend such
anatomical studies to high-dimensional cases.
In a system with a static complexity such as the spin glass problem, the anatomy of
the (energy/fitness) landscape has clarified its ruggedness [6], while, for a dynamic case,
the studies are more difficult, (since “anatomy” itself is a static tool), although some
pioneering approaches have recently been proposed [32, 33, 34] in Hamiltonian dynamical
systems with many degrees of freedom ( e.g., in molecular dynamics). The anatomical
studies exploring the high-dimensional phase space will be important in systems with
evolution and adaptability.
c) Naturalists’ viewpoints
In complex systems, one possible direction is to make a collection of complex behav-
iors, list them up and then classify them. This approach, borrowed from natural history,
has been adopted in complex systems. The classification of the behaviors of cellular au-
tomata by Wolfram [35], although not complete, can belong to this approach. Physicists’
preference to make a “phase diagram” is the simplest version of such classification. In
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complex systems, we have to face more complicated classifications. The naive use of a
phase diagram may not be powerful, there. Indeed, in cellular automata, the lack of a
continuous parameter makes it difficult to construct a phase diagram following the classi-
fication ( see also the paper by Mitchell in the present volume). If a system’s dimension
is very high, construction of a phase diagram is not practical, where one has to resort to
more heuristic approaches. In such cases a naturalist’s approach may be useful.
The three approaches mentioned above are not necessarily sufficient for understanding
all complex systems. These are apparently the approaches from without3, which is usual
and common to conventional sciences. A constructivistic approach is different. A con-
structivist tries to make an uncontrollable world inside a computer which is controllable
from outside, to make the world be functional. A decisive point for the success of the
modeling lies in the construction of an internal mechanism. Therefore, a constructivist’s
approach is inevitably an approach from within. We discuss this point in the next section.
7 Internal observer
In a system with artificial reality, one has to construct an internal observer; other-
wise a system can never be intelligent. In molecular biological systems, among others,
Conrad[37], Ro¨ssler [36], Matsuno[38], and one of the authors (IT) [39] have pointed out
the significance of an internal observer which reacts with high efficacy. In brain modeling
also, it has been pointed out that the introduction of an internal viewpoint would be
essential to understand ‘the brain understanding itself’. If chaos works in many phases
of brain activities, chaos can be a candidate of such an internal observer. This viewpoint
has been called “chaotic hermeneutics” by one of the authors (IT) [39].
The significance of internal viewpoints for the “understanding” of systems was first
proposed by Go¨del [40] in constructing a theory to involve a description, from without,
of formal system into again the formal system, thus a description from within. By this
constructive approach, Go¨del succeeded to prove that there exists a theorem which is
true, but unprovable only by using theorems of the system. Hereby, the complexity of
formal systems was elucidated.
Ro¨ssler has proposed a new scientific paradigm, that is, endophysics, generalizing
the internal viewpoint in a formal system to that in physics, chemistry and biology. In
endo-world, it could be that the observation from within differs from, even contradicts to
the observation from without. Only the latter observation has been explicitly performed
in conventional science. In complex systems, however, as has been discussed here, the
observation and description from without are apparently insufficient. Hence, one may
well have to take the endo-viewpoint for a sufficient understanding of complex systems.
Ro¨ssler has constructed chaotic models to recognize the world from within in these
proceedings.
Through the approaches so far we are trying to make a reconstruction of the story
for complex systems. This reconstruction is not necessarily unique. Since the stories can
include many variables and parameters, it is not possible to conclude that only one of
them provides the best model. Thus it could be said that Ockham’s razor has lost its
edge for complex systems we face now. Ro¨ssler’s talk in the workshop seemed to absolve
Ockham’s razor.
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